Wyoming Law Review
Volume 10
Number 2 Small Towns, Big Values:
Professional Responsibility for Practitioners in
Wyoming

Article 7

January 2010

Energy Law -- Finding the Appropriate Authority for Federal Coal
Mine Methane Leasing; Vessels Coal Gas, Inc., 175 I.B.L.A. 8
(2008)
Nicholas T. Haderlie

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr

Recommended Citation
Haderlie, Nicholas T. (2010) "Energy Law -- Finding the Appropriate Authority for Federal Coal Mine
Methane Leasing; Vessels Coal Gas, Inc., 175 I.B.L.A. 8 (2008)," Wyoming Law Review: Vol. 10 : No. 2 ,
Article 7.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol10/iss2/7

This Case Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Wyoming Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Haderlie: Energy Law -- Finding the Appropriate Authority for Federal Coal

CASE NOTE
ENERGY LAW—Finding the Appropriate Authority for Federal Coal Mine
Methane Leasing; Vessels Coal Gas, Inc., 175 I.B.L.A. 8 (2008)
Nicholas T. Haderlie*

Introduction
A Utah coal mining operation vented methane gas into the atmosphere as
it developed its federal coal lease in compliance with Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) regulations.1 Consistent with Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) guidelines, the coal mine operator contracted with another
company to capture the vented methane because it is considered a greenhouse
gas.2 The company profited from capturing the gas because the high concentration
of methane in the vented gas made it marketable.3 Consistent with established
precedent, the Utah State Office of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
decided the methane gas captured from federal lands must be done in compliance
with a federal lease issued under the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA).4 The BLM held
a competitive lease sale, but a third party challenged the sale as anticompetitive.5
After extensive litigation, the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) held
methane gas released incident to coal mining is not a gas deposit, and is therefore
not subject to regulation under the MLA.6
Vessels Coal Gas, Inc. is an administrative decision offering a pragmatic
solution to a unique problem, thereby preventing waste of valuable natural
resources. Despite this positive outcome, the IBLA decision in Vessels unnecessarily
stepped outside the boundaries of established law by redefining the term deposit
when there were legitimate alternative theories to handle each concern the IBLA
espoused in reaching its result.7 Given these considerations, Vessels highlights the
need for legislative clarification in this area of energy law.8

* Candidate for J.D. and M.A. in Environment and Natural Resources, University
of Wyoming, 2011. Thank you to all my editors, including my beautiful wife, for your superb
guidance. Thanks also to Professor Dennis Stickley and Professor Sam Kalen for your insights and
advice on this note.
1

Vessels Coal Gas, Inc., 175 I.B.L.A. 8, 9–10 (2008).

2

Id. at 12–13.

3

Id.

4

Id. at 14.

5

Id. at 15–17.

6

Id. at 24–25.

7

See infra notes 115–18, 134–40, 156–60 and accompanying text.

8

See infra notes 151, 166 and accompanying text.
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As a preliminary matter, the background section of this note outlines
relevant terminology, statutes, and precedent at issue in Vessels.9 The analysis
section illustrates that the IBLA stepped outside the boundaries of existing law.10
Alternative legal approaches to the problem in Vessels and policy considerations
are also evaluated.11 Finally, this note concludes there is a need for legislative
clarification regarding coal mine methane leasing to ensure stability in this area of
natural resource development.12

Background
Terminology
A few basic terms are essential to understanding the issues raised in
Vessels. Methane is a hydrocarbon associated with petroleum formed by the
decomposition of organic matter.13 Methane is the most common and abundant
of all the hydrocarbons that constitute natural gas, and it is often associated with
coal mining.14 Methane has no taste, color, or odor, and it can form an explosive
mixture when combined with air.15
Coalbed methane (CBM) is methane gas found in and released from coal
deposits.16 CBM is found both in the fractures of a coal seam and within the
coal itself.17 CBM is extracted in two ways: (1) traditional drilling of vertical
wells, independent of coal mining; and (2) in conjunction with the coal
mining process.18

9

See infra notes 13–56 and accompanying text.

10

See infra notes 112–25, 141–51 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 115–18, 136–40, 156–60, 161–72 and accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 173–80 and accompanying text.

Bureau of Mines, A Dictionary of Mining, Mineral, and Related Terms 700 (1968);
A. Nelson, Dictionary of Mining 281 (1965); 8 Howard R. Williams & Charles J. Meyers, Oil
and Gas Law 600–01 (LexisNexis 2008).
13

14

See sources cited supra note 13.

15

See sources cited supra note 13.

Dennis C. Stickley, Petroleum Industry Words & Phrases 68 (2007). CBM is
alternatively referred to as “coalbed methane gas, coalbed methane, coal seam gas, occluded coalbed
methane gas . . . firedamp, and . . . a variety of similar terms.” NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank, N.A.
v. West, 631 So. 2d 212, 213 n.2 (Ala. 1993) (citing Jeff L. Lewin et al., Unlocking the Fire: A
Proposal for Judicial Determination of the Ownership of Coalbed Methane, 94 W. Va. L. Rev. 563,
566–67 (1992)).
16

Fred Bosselman, Joel B. Eisen, Jim Rossi, David B. Spence & Jacqueline Weaver,
Energy, Economics and the Environment 551 (2d ed. 2006).
17

18

Id. at 551–52.
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Coalmine methane (CMM) is a form of coalbed methane, sometimes called
“gob gas.”19 In the long wall coal mining method, CMM comes from the extraction
of CBM from “gob hole vents” or “gob wells” in quantities often containing
as much as ninety-five percent marketable methane.20 CMM is derived from
a combination of sources, including CBM released from a primary coal seam,
smaller unmineable coal seams and other nearby mine workings, strata gases from
coal seams that are trapped in noncoal strata, and from natural gas otherwise
originating in noncoal strata.21
Ventilation air methane (VAM) is an air and methane mixture that is created
when vents push external air into a mine to mix with and dilute methane gas
released inadvertently during long wall coal mining.22 The mixture is then expelled
via vents in the mine, creating VAM.23 VAM is not a marketable form of methane
because it usually contains less than one percent methane, and therefore does not
exhibit the same high concentrations of methane gas as CMM.24

Statutes, Regulations, and Policies
The canary in the coal mine, as a sentinel of hazard to human health, has
been replaced with statutes, rules, and regulations promulgated by the Mine
Safety and Health Administration.25 A division of the Labor Department, MSHA

19

Id. at 552.

Id.; Vessels Coal Gas, Inc., 175 I.B.L.A. 8, 11–12 (2008). Long wall coal mining is an
underground method where a “series of longwalls, or rooms, separated by pillars” are excavated.
Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 11. Coal is extracted from the rooms while the pillars are used for support to
prevent the surface from collapsing. Id.
20

Bosselman et al., supra note 17, at 552. CMM is emitted from at least six sources
including “degasification systems at underground coal mines,” “ventilation air from underground
mines,” “abandoned or closed mines,” “surface mines,” and “fugitive emissions from post-mining
operations, in which coal continues to emit methane as it is stored in piles and transported.” Envtl.
Prot. Agency, Coalbed Methane Outreach Program (2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/
cmop/basic.html [hereinafter EPA CMOP].
21

22

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 11.

23

Id.

Id. at 11–12 (emphasizing the low concentrations of methane in VAM and its similarly low
contribution to greenhouse gas emissions when vented); see also EPA CMOP, supra note 21 (offering
information about the EPA’s Coalbed Methane Outreach Program, including a description of VAM
and how it is created).
24

25
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (1977).
For an explanation of the concept of the canary in the coal mine, see Yale University School of
Medicine, Canary Database: What Are Animal Sentinels?, http://canarydatabase.org/about/what_
are_animal_sentinels/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2010) (“Well into the 20th century, coal miners . . .
brought canaries into coal mines as an ‘early warning signal’ for carbon monoxide and other
poisonous gases. The birds would become sick before the miners, who would then have a chance to
escape or put on protective respirators.”).
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has been regulating mine safety since 1978.26 Methane gas is a deadly byproduct
of coal mining that can cause underground explosions; therefore, detection and
removal of coal mine methane is important to protect the health and safety of coal
miners.27 As a result, MSHA requires coal mines to ventilate or otherwise remove
methane incident to the mining process in order to prevent explosions.28
Methane is dangerous to miners, but it is also considered a greenhouse
gas by the Environmental Protection Agency.29 Although there are no current
EPA regulations requiring capture of ventilated methane, such regulation
may be imminent with growing public concern and increased litigation over
greenhouse gas emissions.30 If CMM is vented into the atmosphere and not
captured—as was largely done with VAM in the past—it may have the potential
to adversely contribute to climate change.31 Thus, the EPA advocates that coal
mines voluntarily adopt programs to capture vented methane, thereby reducing

26
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290; see also
Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–965 (2006) (codifying the current version of the
Act, which includes a host of health and safety regulations affecting various mining operations).
27
Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 10–11 (2008) (“The old adage of the canary in the coal mine
establishes well enough . . . that coal mining releases methane.”); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. S.
Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 871 (1999); Freeman Coal Mining Co. v. Interior Bd. of Mine
Operations Appeals, 504 F.2d 741, 746–47 (7th Cir. 1974) (discussing the deadly nature of methane
gas in coal mining); supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text (defining methane gas).

30 U.S.C. § 863 (requiring ventilation of coal mines); Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 10–11;
Newman v. RAG Wyo. Land Co., 53 P.3d 540, 545 (Wyo. 2002) (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge,
468 A.2d 1380, 1382 (Pa. 1983) (discussing the safety requirements of coal mine ventilation)).
28

29
See generally EPA CMOP, supra note 21 (discussing coal mine methane generally); Envtl.
Prot. Agency, Global Mitigation of Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases (2006), available at http://
www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/international.html [hereinafter EPA Global Mitigation].
30
James A. Holtkamp & Rebecca A. Ryon, Capture of Ventilated Methane from Mining
Operations: Ownership, Regulation, and Liability Issues, 55 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 26-1, 26-5
to -12 (2009) (discussing the possibility of regulation under the Clean Air Act, the National
Environmental Policy Act, proposed mandatory emission reporting rules, and possible climate
change legislation). See generally Wendy B. Davis, Coalbed Methane: Degasification, Not Ventilation,
Should Be Required, 2 Appalachian L.J. 25 (2003); Kathy J. Flaherty, Quandry or Quest: Problems of
Developing Coalbed Methane as an Energy Resource, 15 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 71 (2000);
EPA CMOP, supra note 21.

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 12; Envtl. Prot. Agency, Coalbed Methane Outreach
Program Brochure, http://www.epa.gov/cmop/docs/brochure_2005.pdf (last visited May 18, 2010)
(“[M]ethane is more than 20 times more powerful (by weight) at warming the atmosphere than
carbon dioxide. Coal mining is a significant source of methane: it contributes about 10 percent of all
human-related methane emissions in the United States.”) [hereinafter EPA CMOP Brochure]; see
also Davis, supra note 30, at 32–33; EPA Global Mitigation, supra note 29; Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Methane to Markets, Underground Coal Mine Methane Recovery and Use Opportunities
(Mar. 2008), http://methanetomarkets.org/documents/coal_fs_eng.pdf (“Globally, CMM accounts
for 6 percent of total methane emissions resulting from human activities.”).
31
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greenhouse gas emissions from the coal mining process.32 The EPA’s goal is to
simultaneously facilitate the capture of CMM for profit, promote mine safety,
and prevent discharge of CMM into the atmosphere.33
In addition to health, safety, and environmental concerns, public policy also
discourages waste of natural resources generally.34 Even though some waste may
be permissible in the event of mineral estate conflict, it is otherwise forbidden.35
As such, most oil and gas producing states have made it their express policy to
avoid waste of natural resources, always recovering as much as possible.36
The Mineral Leasing Act is another body of law important in analyzing
Vessels. The MLA facilitates leasing federal oil and gas lands.37 The right to produce
methane gas on public lands is acquired by obtaining a federal oil and gas lease
through the competitive bidding process compelled by the MLA.38 The BLM has
broad discretion in determining which federal lands will be available for leasing,
and is under no legal obligation to make any particular tract available.39 The MLA
32

EPA CMOP, supra note 21.

Id.; see also Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 12 (“The goal of this program is ‘to promote the profitable
recovery and use of coal mine methane (CMM), a greenhouse gas more than 20 times as potent as
carbon dioxide.’”) (quoting EPA CMOP, supra note 21).
33

34
E.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 38-08-01 (2008). North Dakota’s statute is exemplary of
most states:

It is hereby declared to be in the public interest to foster, to encourage, and to
promote the development, production, and utilization of natural resources of oil and
gas in the state in such a manner as will prevent waste . . . [and] in such a manner that
a greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas be had . . . .
Id.; see also, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 82-11-121 (2007); Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 (2008); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 30-5-102 (2009).
35
Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 878–79 (1999) (“[A coal lessee
has] the established common-law right of the owner of one mineral estate to use, and even damage,
a neighboring estate as necessary and reasonable to the extraction of his own minerals.”); see also
Michael F. Geiger, L.L.C. v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 2d 885, 889 (W.D. Ky. 2006) (noting the
coal lessee has a right to use or damage a neighboring gas estate as much as reasonably required
to extract coal); Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 135 (N.D. 1979) (discussing the
implied rights of the mineral estate to dominate the surface estate as much as is reasonably necessary
to explore for and extract minerals); infra note 147 and accompanying text (citing sources discussing
mineral estate dominance and conflicts between estates).
36
E.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-102; see also supra note 34 (citing statutes expressly
discouraging waste of natural resources).
37

See generally 30 U.S.C. §§ 181–263 (2006).

30 U.S.C. § 226; 2 George C. Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Public Natural
Resource Law § 23.03 (1994); John F. Shepherd & Jeanine Feriancek, A Guide to the Federal Onshore
Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987, Nat. Res., Energy, and Envtl. L. Sec. Monograph Series
No. 9, at 11–15 (1989).
38

39
30 U.S.C. § 226(a) (“All lands . . . believed to contain oil or gas deposits may be leased by
the Secretary.”) (emphasis added); see also 2 Coggins & Glicksman, supra note 38, § 23.03[2][a];
5 Eugene O. Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 67.2 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed.,
2010).
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only allows noncompetitive leasing of lands if the same lands were previously
offered for competitive leasing, but did not receive a minimum acceptable bid.40
The MLA does not specifically address coal mine methane, but all other forms of
federally owned methane are usually leased under MLA procedures.41
Finally, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) is another
statute that could be used to legally capture federal coal mine methane.42 Under
FLPMA, the Secretary of the Interior is directed to “regulate, through easements,
permits, leases, licenses, published rules, or other instruments as the secretary
deems appropriate, the use, occupancy, and development of the public lands.”43
The Secretary has broad discretion in authorizing land use under FLPMA and
such land use authorization may be offered competitively or noncompetitively
through private negotiation.44

The Owner of Federal Coal Does Not Own Federal Methane
The United States Supreme Court case Amoco Production Co. v. Southern
Ute Indian Tribe is the foundation case regarding ownership of federal methane
incident to coal seams.45 The issue in Amoco was whether the United States

30 U.S.C. § 226(b) (allowing noncompetitive leasing under § 226(c) if the subject lands
were previously offered for competitive sale and did not receive a minimum acceptable bid, and the
competitive sale occurred within two years of the noncompetitive lease sale); see also Shephard &
Feriancek, supra note 38, at 15.
40

41
30 U.S.C. § 181 (“Deposits of . . . gas . . . shall be subject to disposition in the form
and manner provided by this chapter [of the MLA] . . . .”). While this proposition is true under
current law, whether the MLA should apply to CMM is ultimately the crux of the debate in Vessels:
the IBLA avoided the MLA in its decision because it felt the MLA was not well suited to handle
CMM, but Vessels argued the MLA should apply because it was the only available source of leasing
authority. Vessels Coal Gas, Inc., 175 I.B.L.A. 8, 19, 25–26 (2008). Also, Oso initially requested
a license from the BLM under the broad secretarial powers it has under the FLPMA, which was
ultimately denied by the BLM when it recognized the MLA as the appropriate source of authority.
Id. at 14. These facts highlight the confusion surrounding CMM leasing, and thus the need for
legislative clarification. See infra notes 69, 89–90, 151, 166 and accompanying text (discussing both
the confusion behind the appropriate leasing authority and the need for legislative clarification of
the same).
42

Holtkamp & Ryon, supra note 30, at 26-17.

43

43 U.S.C. § 1732 (2006).

44

Holtkamp & Ryon, supra note 30, at 26-16 to -17 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 2920.5-4(b) (2009)).

526 U.S. 865, 873–78, 880 (1999). Amoco is the subject of much publication and
commentary. E.g., Anita S. Bryant, Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 27
Ecology L.Q. 799 (2000); Elizabeth A. McClanahan & Jill M. Harrison, Southern Ute: Trial
Court to Supreme Court, 15 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 247 (2001); Laura D. Windsor, Amoco
Production Company v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe: A Final Resolution to the Battle over Ownership
of Coalbed Methane Gas?, 17 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 893 (2001).
45
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intended to reserve methane gas when it reserved coal in lands patented under
the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910; specifically, whether CBM should be
considered incident to the coal.46
The issue arose when commercial interest grew in developing CBM, but it
was unclear whether the reservation of coal to the United States also included
rights to incidental methane.47 In response to this uncertainty, the Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior published an opinion in which he concluded the 1909
and 1910 Acts reserving coal to the United States did not reserve CBM.48 Relying
on this conclusion, development companies entered into oil and gas leases with
surface owners covering an estimated 200,000 surface acres patented under the
1909 and 1910 Acts, under which the Southern Ute Indian Tribe owned the
coal.49 Claiming an executive interest in the CBM, the Tribe brought suit against
production companies, royalty owners, federal agencies, and officials involved in
the production and marketing of the CBM from the lands at issue.50 The Tribe
argued the reservation of coal to the United States in the 1909 and 1910 Acts
included CBM, so the Tribe—not the successors in interest to the land patents—
would own the gas.51
The case rose to the United States Supreme Court.52 The majority focused on
the issue of whether Congress regarded CBM as a part of coal at the time it made

46
Amoco, 526 U.S. at 867, 873 (“The question is not whether, given what scientists know
today, it makes sense to regard CBM as a constituent of coal but whether Congress so regarded it in
1909 and 1910.”). The United States patented millions of acres of land under the 1909 and 1910
Acts, some of which were former Indian reservation lands once belonging to the Southern Ute
Indian Tribe. Id. at 870. In 1938, the United States restored title to all of the former reservation
lands not yet patented back to the Tribe, along with all of the coal, including coal reserved from
lands already patented under the 1909 and 1910 Acts. Id.; Windsor, supra note 45, at 896–97.

Amoco, 526 U.S. at 871. CBM development has since boomed and is a major source of
natural gas in the United States. Windsor, supra note 45, at 899 (“Today CBM accounts for an
estimated fifteen percent of potential United States natural gas reserves.”); see also Anne MacKinnon
& Kate Fox, Demanding Beneficial Use: Opportunities and Obligations for Wyoming Regulators in
Coalbed Methane, 6 Wyo. L. Rev. 369, 370 (2006) (discussing issues surrounding increased CBM
development in Wyoming).
47

Amoco, 526 U.S. at 871 (citing Ownership of and Right to Extract Coalbed Gas in Federal
Coal Deposits, 88 Interior Dec. 538, 538–39 (1981)).
48

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142, 1154 (D. Colo. 1995) (holding
the plain meaning of coal includes only the solid rock substance commonly used for fuel and does
not include CBM), rev’d, 119 F.3d 816, 828 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding CBM was included when the
United States reserved coal in lands patented under the 1909 and 1910 Acts), aff ’d on reh’g, 151 F.3d
1251, 1267 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding the term coal ambiguous, construing the reservation in favor
of the sovereign and finding the reservation of coal in the 1909 and 1910 Acts to the United States
necessarily included a reservation of CBM), rev’d, 526 U.S. 865, 880 (1999); see also McClanahan &
52
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the reservations in 1909 and 1910.53 Based on historical context surrounding
the passage of the legislation, the Court found “the most natural interpretation
of ‘coal’ as used in the 1909 and 1910 Acts does not encompass CBM gas.”54
Therefore, the important point from Amoco is the bright-line substantive property
rule ultimately established: CBM is not a part of the federal coal estate, and
therefore any rights in the methane belong to the successor in interest to the
patent granting title to surface ownership.55 Federal coal leases do not convey any
rights in methane.56

Principal Case
In compliance with MSHA safety requirements, Utah American Energy, Inc.
(UAE) vented VAM from its Aberdeen Coal Mine with a fan and ventilation
system.57 Methane concentrations increased at Aberdeen as UAE mined toward
depths reaching 3,000 feet, and the existing ventilation system was not sufficient
to remove the deadly gas.58 As a result, MSHA ordered UAE to install an enhanced
methane removal system.59 At a cost upwards of two million dollars, UAE installed
a state-of-the-art system.60 The new system removed large concentrations of
marketable CMM through deeply drilled vertical vent holes.61 UAE entered into
Harrison, supra note 45, at 247–60; Windsor, supra note 45, at 895–913 (detailing the procedural
history and disposition of cases leading up to Amoco).
53

Amoco, 526 U.S. at 873.

54

Id. at 880.

55

Id.

Id. While Amoco determined who owns CBM under federal land patents, the question
is not well settled among the states: some courts agree with the holding in Amoco that the owner
of the coal does not own the CBM. E.g., In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 207 B.R. 299, 305
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997); NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank, N.A. v. West, 631 So. 2d 212, 229 (Ala. 1993);
Carbon County v. Union Reserve Oil Co., 898 P.2d 680, 687–88 (Mont. 1995). Some courts have
found the owner of the coal owns the CBM. E.g., Vines v. McKenzie Methane Corp., 619 So. 2d
1305, 1309 (Ala. 1993); Cont’l Res. of Ill., Inc. v. Ill. Methane, L.L.C., 847 N.E.2d 897, 902
(Ill. 2006); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1384–85 (Pa. 1983). Other courts—most
notably the Wyoming Supreme Court—have adopted case-by-case analysis of the parties’ intent and
surrounding circumstances. E.g., Caballo Coal Co. v. Fid. Expl. & Prod. Co., 84 P.3d 311, 314–15
(Wyo. 2004); Hickman v. Groves, 71 P.3d 256, 258 (Wyo. 2004); McGee v. Caballo Coal Co., 69
P.3d 908, 912 (Wyo. 2003); Newman v. RAG Wyo. Land Co., 53 P.3d 540, 544–45 (Wyo. 2002);
Energy Dev. Corp. v. Moss, 591 S.E.2d 135, 146, 150 (W. Va. 2003). See generally Bosselman et
al., supra note 17, at 552–53 (discussing all the common law possibilities for determining CBM
ownership, including theories based on priority at severance, successive ownership, and mutual
simultaneous rights); 8 Williams & Meyers, supra note 13, at 151–52.
56

Vessels Coal Gas, Inc., 175 I.B.L.A. 8, 10–11 (2008); see also supra notes 25–28 and
accompanying text (discussing MSHA coal mine ventilation requirements).
57

58

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 11.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 11–12.
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an agreement with Oso Oil and Gas Properties, L.L.C. to facilitate EPA directives
to capture the vented gas.62 Under the agreement, Oso would capture the CMM
at the vents on the surface, then transport it, process it, and market it.63
The Aberdeen mine operated under both public and private coal lease
agreements.64 Oso successfully acquired oil and gas leases from the private mineral
owners in order to conduct its methane capturing operation at the vents located
on private parcels.65 The parcels of the mine on public lands are subject to federal
coal leases.66 Federal coal leases “give the lessee the right to explore for, mine,
and produce coal deposits.”67 Federal coal leases, however, do not give any of
these rights with respect to oil or gas.68 To legally capture the methane gas over
the federal parcels, Oso requested a license be issued under the broad secretarial
powers of the BLM.69 Consistent with the United States Supreme Court holding
in Amoco, the BLM determined the only way for Oso to legally capture the vented
methane from the coal mine over the federal parcels was to acquire a federal oil
and gas lease under the MLA.70
Meanwhile, Vessels Coal Gas, Inc. discovered the agreement between UAE
and Oso and tried to join the operation.71 UAE informed Vessels that the only
way it could be directly involved was by ancillary agreement with Oso, which
apparently never came to fruition.72 Determined to participate, Vessels began
acquiring private oil and gas leases in lands surrounding the area of the coal mine.73
When the BLM issued a Notice of Competitive Lease Sale that included leases for

Id. at 12; see also supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text (discussing the EPA’s Coalbed
Methane Outreach Program, encouraging the voluntary capture of vented CMM).
62

63

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 12.

64

Id. at 9–10.

65

Id. at 13.

Id. at 9–10; see also 30 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of Interior to divide
federal coal lands into tracts and award leases by competitive bidding).
66

67

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 9; see also 30 U.S.C. §§ 201–209 (providing for federal coal leasing).

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 9 (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865,
879–80 (1999)).
68

Id. at 13 (arguing the BLM had authority to issue such a license under the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act, instead of a lease under the MLA); see supra notes 41–44 and
accompanying text (discussing the underlying issue in Vessels of what the appropriate source of
authority for CMM leasing is and the possibility of a FLPMA lease).
69

70
Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 14 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 226 (2000)); see also 2 Coggins & Glickman,
supra note 38, § 23.03 (discussing MLA leasing procedures and requirements). See generally supra
notes 37–41 and accompanying text (describing basic MLA leasing requirements).
71

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 15.

72

Id.

73

Id.
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the federal parcels at issue, Vessels protested.74 Vessels contended stipulations in
the leases made them “anticompetitive and inconsistent” with the requirements
of the MLA because the stipulations gave UAE operational control of the CMM
vents, and therefore of any federal oil and gas lease over any parcels containing
the vents.75 As such, Vessels maintained that the stipulations inappropriately
delegated BLM’s regulatory authority for oil and gas leases to UAE.76
The lease sale went on and Oso acquired the federal oil and gas leases.77
Vessels filed a protest to the lease sale that was ultimately denied by the Utah
State Director of the BLM.78 The Director said the MLA did not apply to the
sale because the gas at issue did not meet the definition of gas normally subject
to regulation under the MLA since the Director thought it did not contain high
enough methane concentrations (he mistakenly believed the leases were for VAM
rather than CMM).79 The Director concluded the leases at issue did not permit
recovery of gas normally subject to the MLA, and thus were not MLA leases.80
Vessels appealed the BLM’s decision to the Interior Board of Land Appeals.81
The IBLA found that the BLM inappropriately premised its decision on the
notion that methane emitted from the mine was not gas because it was artificially
created and not “produced in a natural state from the earth,” as required by the
federal definition of gas subject to the MLA.82 The IBLA disagreed with the
Id. at 17; see also 30 U.S.C. § 226(f ) (2006) (“Such notice shall be posted in the appropriate
local office of the leasing and land management agencies . . . [and] shall include the terms or
modified lease terms and maps or narrative descriptions of the affected lands.”). The BLM decided
to issue leases over the Aberdeen mine notwithstanding an existing policy against gas leasing over
long wall coal mines. Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 10, 16.
74

75

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 17.

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Id. at 18.

Id.; see supra note 24 and accompanying text (explaining the difference between VAM and
CMM). Another rationale for the Director’s decision was that the gas “is artificially created in the
mine and discharged through a mechanical ventilation system at the earth’s surface.” Vessels, 175
I.B.L.A. at 18.
79

80

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 18, 21.

Id. at 18–21. The IBLA hears appeals from decisions of the Bureau of Land
Management, the Minerals Management Service, and the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation
and Enforcement, or any administrative law judge decision made under subparts E and L
of 43 C.F.R. part 4. See generally Department Hearings and Appeals Procedures, 43 C.F.R.
pt. 4 (2008); Office of Hearings and Appeals, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Interior
Board of Land Appeals Manual (2009), available at http://www.oha.doi.gov/manuals/
IBLA%20Manual%202009%200612.pdf (setting forth procedures and practices the IBLA follows
in adjudicating appeals); James M. Day, Federal Oil and Gas Lease Appeals in the Department of the
Interior, in Nat. Res., Energy, and Envtl. L. Sec. Monograph Series No. 18 (1992) (describing
IBLA jurisdiction, standing to appeal, appeals procedures, and other jurisdictional and evidentiary
issues that arise in appealing federal oil and gas leasing decisions to the Department of the Interior).
81

82

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 18, 19.
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Director’s decision that the methane at issue was not subject to the MLA because
such a classification of CMM would throw methane leasing in other contexts into
disarray.83 According to the IBLA, this project and case arose precisely because the
gas at issue was something more than VAM.84 The IBLA refused to define CMM
containing high concentrations of methane as something other than gas simply
because “it is produced as an inadvertent byproduct of coal mining,” noting that
“it is being captured because it is methane gas.”85 The IBLA also reasoned it was
inconsistent for the Director to contend the methane at issue was not gas under
the MLA, while simultaneously upholding the MLA lease sale.86
Citing the Director’s mistake of fact and the inconsistent positions held by the
BLM, the IBLA reversed the Director’s decision denying Vessels’s protest to the
lease sale.87 However, Vessels requested both a reversal of the Director’s decision,
as well as an order from the IBLA forcing a second competitive lease sale under
the MLA for the same leases, but without the offending stipulations.88
In determining whether Vessels was entitled to relief in the form of a new
competitive lease sale, the IBLA addressed the threshold issue of whether the
MLA was the appropriate source of authority for leasing in this type of situation.89
The IBLA found the MLA does not contemplate the novel issue presented by
an oil and gas company capturing and marketing gas vented by an underground
coal mine.90 The IBLA pointed to language in the MLA, which states in relevant
part that “[d]eposits of . . . oil . . . gas, and lands containing such deposits . . . shall
be subject to disposition in the form and manner provided by this chapter.”91

83
Id. at 21 (agreeing with Vessels that holding CMM to be something other than gas would
conflict with coalbed methane leasing under the MLA).
84
Id. (“[The Director’s] logic misses the entire nature of the project and undercuts the
rationale of his decision affirming competitive bidding for MLA leases.”).
85

Id. at 22.

Id. at 21–22. The IBLA used this reasoning against the Director, yet ignored that its
decision in this case has the exact same result; namely, the IBLA denied that the MLA applies, yet
upheld the MLA leases at issue. Id. at 25–27; see also infra notes 154–55 and accompanying text
(discussing the inconsistency in upholding the MLA lease at issue while simultaneously contending
the MLA does not apply).
86

87

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 21.

88

Id. at 22.

Id. at 23. The IBLA first determined the BLM was under no obligation to issue MLA leases
for oil and gas deposits because there is no “foundation in any law or rule” supporting the idea that a
competitive lease sale must be held simply because coal mining is taking place. Id. at 24. Therefore,
the IBLA concluded it was not necessary to hold a second competitive lease sale, even though
the State Director’s decision denying Vessels’s protest was reversed. Id.; see also supra note 39 and
accompanying text (discussing the BLM’s discretion in determining whether to offer a particular
tract for oil and gas leasing).
89

90

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 25.

91

Id. (citing 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2000)).
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The IBLA also pointed to § 226 of the MLA which states “[a]ll lands subject to
disposition under this chapter which are known or believed to contain oil or gas
deposits may be leased by the Secretary.”92
Using these two sections of the MLA, the IBLA reasoned “[g]as already
legally released into the atmosphere is not remotely a ‘deposit.’”93 The IBLA also
offered a definition from an industry dictionary defining “‘deposit’ to be ‘anything
laid down,’ and ‘mineral deposit’ as ‘a natural occurrence of a useful mineral . . .
in sufficient extent and degree of concentration to invite exploitation.’”94 The
IBLA concluded a deposit “is the mineral in place in the ground.”95 The IBLA
also contended the purpose of the MLA was to facilitate oil and gas leasing for
purposes of exploration, drilling, mining, extracting, and production of “oil and
gas deposits in place.”96 The IBLA said this was not the purpose of the project in
this case because there was no deposit and a coal lessee was merely liberating gas
as a result of its coal mining.97 On these bases, the IBLA decided the gas vented
from a coal mine is not a deposit of gas.98
The IBLA also gave three further rationales justifying its decision.99 First,
the IBLA concluded that any finding otherwise would essentially put the coal
lessee in the position of paying for the drilling and exploration costs normally
associated with federal oil and gas leases by giving the oil and gas lessee the ability
to capture the methane at the coal miner’s expense of installing the methane
vents.100 Second, the IBLA reasoned if it found the vented gas was a deposit,
the coal lessee might be accused of “acting with respect to a deposit in a manner
appropriate only for an oil and gas lessee, contrary to the limited rights it is given
under its coal lease,” because federal methane is a part of the oil and gas estate and
not part of the coal estate.101 Finally, the IBLA cited practical reasons for denying
Vessels’s request: “UAE and Oso have collaborated in creating a new coal mine
degasification operation that has the benefit of protecting miners as required by

92

30 U.S.C. § 226; Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 25.

93

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 25.

94

Id. (citing Bureau of Mines, supra note 13).

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id.

Id. at 25–26. The IBLA was not addressing any particular party’s arguments, but offering
dicta to support its departure from existing precedent. See id. (justifying the decision declining to
extend the MLA to cover vented coal mine methane).
99

100

Id.

Id. (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 879–80 (1999)); see
also supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text (reciting the bright-line property rule established by
Amoco: CBM is not part of the federal coal estate).
101
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MSHA, minimizing pollution to the environment as sought by the EPA, and
permitting use of additional energy resources as promoted by national policy.”102
The IBLA concluded there was nothing in the MLA compelling the BLM to
impose an uninvited third party on the project.103 Declining to order a second
competitive lease sale, the IBLA held gas vented from a coal mine is not a deposit
of gas, and therefore is not subject to the MLA, which only requires federal leasing
for deposits of oil and gas.104

Analysis
The IBLA offered a practical solution to a unique problem with the Vessels
decision. The MSHA requires venting methane for mine safety.105 The EPA
promotes capturing vented methane to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.106
Public policy discourages waste of natural resources.107 The decision in Vessels
simultaneously advances all of these policies.108 Unfortunately, the decision
accomplishes this in a logically inconsistent manner that does not comport with
existing precedent. First, the IBLA either disingenuously or incorrectly defined
deposit.109 Second, while the rationales offered by the IBLA raise legitimate
concerns, they do not justify a decision contravening precedent when there
are legitimate legal alternatives available to address such concerns.110 Finally,
this section highlights important environmental and political considerations
not entirely accounted for in the Vessels decision that need to be more carefully
evaluated and considered in future CMM leasing.111

The Definition of Deposit
The Vessels decision rests upon a dictionary definition of the term deposit.112
The IBLA’s choice of definition for the term deposit is susceptible to criticism

102

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 26.

103

Id.

104

Id.

30 U.S.C. § 863 (2006); supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text (discussing mine safety
requirements).
105

106
Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 11–12; supra notes 29–33 (discussing EPA greenhouse gas reduction
guidelines).
107
E.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-102 (2009); see also supra note 34 (citing statutes codifying
policies against waste of natural resources).
108

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 26.

109

See infra notes 112–25 and accompanying text.

110

See infra notes 126–60 and accompanying text.

111

See infra notes 161–72 and accompanying text.

112

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 25.
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in that it may have been disingenuously selected merely to render results.113 The
IBLA inferred from various pieces of a definition that a deposit is a mineral in place
in the ground.114 However, another industry-accepted definition has no “in place
in the ground” requirement: a deposit is “[a]n accumulation of oil, gas or other
minerals capable of production.”115 The gas at issue in Vessels was an accumulation
capable of production, and was therefore a deposit according to this alternative
definition.116 Furthermore, before Vessels was decided, the American Geological
Institute updated the Dictionary of Mining, Mineral, and Related Terms, extending
its definition of deposit to include “[m]aterial of any type, either consolidated
or unconsolidated, that has accumulated by some natural process or agent” and
“[a]n accumulation of ore or other valuable earth material of any origin.”117 The
IBLA’s definition requiring a deposit to be in place in the ground ignores these
alternative industry-accepted definitions of the term.118
Even if the IBLA’s definition of the term deposit is appropriate, application of
the definition produces an absurd logical contradiction.119 The IBLA’s definition of
a deposit that would be subject to the MLA is a mineral in place in the ground.120
It follows that a mineral not in place in the ground is not a deposit, and is not
subject to the MLA.121 The reductio ad absurdum argument against these premises
113
Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 69 n.7 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (implying the
majority selected one of many available definitions without explanation merely to support its broad
definition of the term “economic”); Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 502 (1945) (“[A] word,
read in its context in the statute, is far more revealing of the legislative purpose than the arbitrary
selection of one of its dictionary meanings to the exclusion of others which are equally applicable.”);
United States v. Cabaccang, 332 F.3d 662, 640 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“A statute
does not have a plain meaning just because one cherry-picked dictionary definition happens to
support it.”).
114

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 25 (citing Bureau of Mines, supra note 13).

115

8 Williams & Meyers, supra note 13, at 255.

116

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 12; 8 Williams & Meyers, supra note 13, at 255.

Am. Geological Inst., A Dictionary
(emphasis added).
117

of

Mining, Mineral,

and

Related Terms (1997)

118
It is a legitimate exercise in statutory interpretation to rely on dictionary definitions. See,
e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 961–62 (1988) (relying on multiple dictionaries to
interpret the term “servitude”). But see Vines v. McKenzie Methane Corp., 619 So. 2d 1305, 1307
(Ala. 1993) (“The meaning of the term ‘minerals’ as that word is used in any particular grant or
reservation is not to be determined by rigid and arbitrary definitions, but from the language of the
grant or reservation, the surrounding circumstances, and the intention of the grantor, if it can be
ascertained.”). Choosing one dictionary definition of a term to the exclusion of alternatives without
explanation is questionable. See cases cited supra note 113.

See E.J. Lemmon, Beginning Logic 26 (Hackett Publ’g. Co. 1978) (describing the basic
rules of the propositional calculus that modern symbolic logic is founded on); cf. Sierra Club v.
Andrus, 581 F.2d 895, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 347 (1979) (“The
principle of Reductio ad absurdum is part of the landscape of logic.”).
119

120

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 25.

Id. at 26 (“The methane mixture released by coal mining . . . is not the oil and gas deposit
addressed by leasing under the MLA.”).
121
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is as follows: CMM is in place in the ground before coal mining happens, and is
therefore subject to the MLA.122 The same CMM is not in place in the ground
after coal mining happens, and is therefore not subject to the MLA.123 This is
an absurd result because the CMM cannot be both subject to the MLA and not
subject to the MLA.124 The IBLA’s definition of deposit ignores this contradiction:
the MLA may apply at one given time and not at a later time over the exact same
molecules of gas.125 The definition would no longer produce this absurd result if
the “in place in the ground” requirement were abandoned in favor of more recent
industry definitions.

Three Rationales Offered by the IBLA
The IBLA offered three rationales as justification for declining to extend
MLA leasing to CMM by redefining deposit.126 However, an alternative legal
theory was available to handle each concern raised by the IBLA without departing
from precedent.127 The first concern that MLA leasing of CMM would put the
coal lessee in the untenable economic position of shouldering the burden of
gas exploration costs could be handled by a theory of contract implied in law
between the coal and gas estates.128 The second concern that the coal lessee may
be faced with violating the gas owner’s rights is alleviated by the doctrine that a
coal lessee may infringe on, and even destroy, so much of neighboring estates as
is reasonably necessary to mine the coal.129 Finally, the concern that nothing in
the MLA compels the IBLA to allow third-party intervention in a case like Vessels
can be addressed with the broad discretion the BLM is otherwise afforded either
under the MLA or alternatively under the FLPMA.130
See id. at 25 (assuming deposit means a mineral in place in the ground, and therefore any
methane in place in the ground is a deposit subject to MLA leasing).
122

123

See id. at 26 (holding methane released by coal mining is not subject to MLA leasing).

Cf. Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1567–68 (2009) (employing reductio ad
absurdum reasoning in determining whether Congress intended to discard or narrow the McNabbMalory rule when it passed 18 U.S.C. § 3501); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358–59 (1979)
(citing the lower court’s reductio ad absurdum argument with approval); Sierra Club, 581 F.2d at
902, rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 347 (relying on reductio ad absurdum and noting the absurdity
of requiring an EIS on every federal land management decision); Lemmon, supra note 119, at 26–27
(“[I]f a contradiction can be deduced from a proposition A, A cannot be true, so that we are entitled
to affirm its negation.”).
124

See Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 26 (applying the term deposit, as used in § 226 of the MLA,
only to methane in place in the ground, but not to the same methane otherwise released from the
ground); see also supra notes 119–24 and accompanying text (showing the logical contradiction
produced by the definition of deposit requiring a mineral to be in place in the ground).
125

126

See infra notes 131–60 and accompanying text.

127

See infra notes 131–60 and accompanying text.

128

See infra notes 131–40 and accompanying text.

129

See infra notes 141–51 and accompanying text.

130

See infra notes 152–60 and accompanying text.
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Coal Lessee in Untenable Economic Position
The IBLA reasoned that extending the MLA to issue leases to an oil and
gas producer that develops gas vented by a coal lessee incident to its mining
operations would effectively force the cost of exploration and production onto
the coal lessee.131 Indeed, federal oil and gas lessees usually confront risk and incur
substantial exploration costs in developing a prospect.132 It is true these risks and
expenses are avoided by the oil and gas lessee in a project like the one in Vessels
because there is no exploration required.133
These legitimate concerns amount to a desire to avoid unjustly enriching the
gas estate at the expense of the coal estate.134 There is no reason to expect a coal
mine to shoulder the costs of exploration for a gas company, while getting none of
the benefit.135 The legal fiction of a contract implied in law exists to handle unjust

131

Vessels Coal Gas, Inc., 175 I.B.L.A. 8, 25–26 (2008).

Energy Info. Admin., Costs and Indices for Domestic Oil and Gas Field Equipment and
Production Operations 1988 Through 2006 (2007), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/
oil_gas/natural_gas/data_publications/cost_indices_equipment_production/current/coststudy.
html; Rob Jessen, Top 10 Risks for the Oil and Gas Industry, J. Petroleum Tech., July 2008, at 18,
available at http://www.spe.org/spe-site/spe/spe/jpt/2008/07/07GuestEdit.pdf.
132

133
Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 26. In jurisdictions where the coal estate owns the CBM, subject
to the rule of capture, the surface owner who captures migrating CBM similarly avoids exploration
costs. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1383 (Pa. 1983) (indicating the surface owner
has title to CBM that may migrate to the surface or surrounding lands as a result of coal or CBM
operations below the surface).
134
Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 25–26 (“[I]t would put the coal lessee in the untenable position of
effectively performing and paying for [oil and gas exploration] . . . with the oil and gas lessee reaping
the benefit of the coal lessee’s work.”).
135
See Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 313 (Wis. 1987) (citing Puttkammer v. Minth, 266
N.W.2d 361, 363 (Wis. 1978)) (“[A]n action for recovery based upon unjust enrichment is grounded
on the moral principle that one who has received a benefit has a duty to make restitution where
retaining such benefit would be unjust.”); see also Bluebonnet Warehouse Coop. v. Bankers Trust
Co., 89 F.3d 292, 300 (6th Cir. 1996); Commerce P’ship 8098 Ltd. P’ship v. Equity Contracting
Co., 695 So. 2d 383, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Restatement (First) of Restitution § 117
(1937). Tentative Draft Number 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment
defines the common law action of restitution as follows:

A person who takes effective action to protect another’s property or economic interests
has a claim in restitution against the other if
(a) the circumstances justify the claimant’s decision to intervene without a
prior agreement for payment or reimbursement, and
(b) it is reasonable for the claimant to assume that the defendant would wish
the action performed.
Restitution under this Section is measured by (i) the loss avoided by the defendant or
(ii) a reasonable charge for the services provided, whichever is less.
Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 21 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).
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enrichment claims like the one at work in Vessels.136 The relationship between a
coal mine venting gas and a gas company capturing it, like in Vessels, satisfies all
the common law elements of unjust enrichment: the coal mine conferred the
benefit on the gas company of shouldering the costs of exploration.137 Aware of
this benefit, the gas company retained or accepted it by capturing the gas without
having explored for it.138 Finally, these circumstances are unjust such that it would
be inequitable if the gas company did not pay fair value for this service.139
Since there may be a contract implied in law between the coal lessee and
the gas lessee, there is no reason to ignore well settled precedent by redefining
deposit to protect the interests of the coal lessee from unjust enrichment. The
IBLA raised legitimate concerns regarding unjust enrichment, but did not appeal
to the alternative doctrine and offered no other foundation in the law to justify
its decision.140

Coal Lessee Faced with Violating Gas Owner’s Rights
In its decision, the IBLA pointed to the United States Supreme Court precedent
it ultimately declined to extend.141 As discussed above, Amoco Production Co. v.
Southern Ute Indian Tribe stands for the proposition that a federal coal lessee has
no rights in the methane gas associated with the coal; rather, those rights are in the
successors in interest to the land surface patentees.142 The IBLA cited Amoco as a
reason not to extend the MLA to cover gas that is incident to coal mining.143 The
IBLA expressed concern that if CMM was a deposit under the MLA, then the
federal coal lessee may be “held accountable for acting with respect to a deposit

136
Commerce P’ship, 695 So. 2d at 386 (noting that a contract implied in law is referred to
alternatively as a “quasi-contract,” “unjust enrichment,” “restitution,” “constructive contract,” and
“quantum meruit”). The equitable remedy of contract implied in law has four elements:

(1) the plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the defendant; (2) the defendant has
knowledge of the benefit; (3) the defendant has accepted or retained the benefit
conferred and (4) the circumstances are such that it would be inequitable for the
defendant to retain the benefit without paying fair value for it.
Id.; see also sources cited supra note 135.
137

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 25–26.

138

Id.

139

Id.; see also supra notes 135–36 (discussing principles of equity underlying contracts implied

in law).
140

See Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 25–26.

141

Id. at 26.

Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 871 (1999); see also supra notes
55–56 and accompanying text (reciting the holding from Amoco).
142

143

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 26.
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in a manner appropriate only for an oil and gas lessee.”144 But the Vessels decision
effectively awarded UAE, the federal coal lessee, the right to privately negotiate
and profit from the capture of the methane from its mine vents.145
UAE’s gas venting operations at Aberdeen did not infringe on the methane
at issue in a manner only appropriate for an oil and gas lessee until it began
extracting the gas for sale to Oso.146 In order to exercise its own rights, the federal
coal lessee necessarily has some right to infringe on the gas incident to the coal.147
Otherwise, under Amoco a federal coal lessee has no right to gas associated with
its coal.148 Even the EPA acknowledges the case law holding that a federal lease
is required for any form of federal methane production.149 The IBLA raised a
Id. Even if the MLA is not extended to cover CMM, a federal coal lessee profiting from the
sale of gas incident to its coal is still acting in a manner only appropriate for an oil and gas lessee. 43
C.F.R. § 9239.0-7 (2009) (“The extraction, severance, injury, or removal of . . . mineral materials
from public lands under the jurisdiction of the Department of Interior, except as authorized by law
and the regulations of the Department, is an act of trespass.”); see also W. Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus,
475 F. Supp. 654, 663 (D. Wyo. 1979), rev’d on other grounds, 664 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1981), rev’d,
462 U.S. 36 (1983) (upholding an IBLA decision finding a trespass on the mineral estate when the
surface owner removed sand and gravel without authorization).
144

145
Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 25–26 (declining to order a second competitive lease sale under
the MLA, thereby allowing UAE to profit from the private contract it had with Oso to capture the
vented methane).
146
See id. at 26 (“UAE arguably risks being held accountable for acting with respect to a
deposit in a manner appropriate only for an oil and gas lessee, contrary to the limited rights it is given
under its coal lease.”) (emphasis added).

See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the common law right of an owner
of one mineral estate to use, and even damage, neighboring estates to the extent it is reasonably
necessary for the extraction of his own minerals). The common law rule in every jurisdiction that
has considered the issue is that the mineral estate is the dominant estate and can enter and use so
much of the servient or neighboring estate as is reasonably necessary to extract minerals. See, e.g.,
Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 135 (N.D. 1979) (“[T]he well-settled rule [is] that
where the mineral estate is severed from the surface estate, the mineral estate is dominant.”); Getty
Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420
S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. 1967); Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976);
Mingo Oil Producers v. Kamp Cattle Co., 776 P.2d 736, 742 (Wyo. 1989) (“It is elementary that
the mineral lessee . . . possesses the dominant estate.”); Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State, 766
P.2d 537, 544 (Wyo. 1988) (“[T]he mineral estate [is] the dominant estate with respect to the
ownership of the surface and the incidents of ownership of a mineral estate include certain inherent
surface rights.”).
147

148
See Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 879–80 (1999) (holding that a
reservation of coal does not encompass methane).

Envtl. Prot. Agency, Identifying Opportunities for Methane Recovery at U.S. Coal
Mines: Profiles of Selected Gassy Underground Coal Mines 2002–2006, 2-19 (rev. Jan. 2009),
available at http://www.epa.gov/cmop/docs/profiles_2008_final.pdf. EPA guidelines explicitly
require a federal lease for vented methane:
149

A developer on federal lands must hold a gas lease in order to put a CBM or
CMM resource to beneficial use. If a company holding a coal lease wants to utilize its
CMM emissions, for example, it must follow the federal leasing procedures in place
for conventional natural gas as prescribed by the BLM. Generally, utilization and/or
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legitimate concern with this rationale, but offered no legal justification for the
conclusion at which it arrived.150 The IBLA’s concern does, however, highlight the
need for legislative clarification regarding CMM leasing.151

A Pragmatic Solution for a Complicated Problem
The final rationale the IBLA offered for declining to extend the MLA to
cover gas incident to coal mining was that two companies created a new coal
mine degasification process complying with both MSHA requirements and EPA
guidelines, and nothing in the MLA compels the IBLA to allow third parties to
intervene.152 Nonetheless, the MLA does compel competitive leasing for federal
gas in the event federal gas is leased.153 Failure to recognize this MLA requirement
resulted in the same inconsistent outcome in Vessels that the IBLA criticized the
State Director for in his original opinion denying Vessels’s protest.154 Namely, the
IBLA denied the MLA covers methane gas captured incident to coal mining, yet
upheld the MLA leases to capture methane gas incident to coal mining.155
Additionally, as the guardian of public lands, the Secretary of the Interior has
broad discretion in determining whether to lease federal oil and gas deposits.156
sales of CMM requires a valid gas lease, regardless of end use. If the leased gas is used
by the mine or mine company, used for power production, or sold to another party,
gas royalties must be paid to the BLM. If no lease is held for the gas, it may only be
vented to the atmosphere for safety purposes as set out by the Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA).
Id. (emphasis added); accord Envtl. Prot. Agency, Coalbed Methane Extra 2007 (2007),
available at http://www.epa.gov/cmop/docs/fall_2007.pdf.
See Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 26; cf. Amoco, 526 U.S. at 871 (holding federal coal estate has
no right to infringe on the CBM incident to its coal except as may be reasonably necessary for
extraction of the coal).
150

151

Windsor, supra note 45, at 918–19 (calling for legislative clarification of CBM ownership).

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 26; see also 30 U.S.C. §§ 181–263 (2006); 2 Coggins & Glicksman,
supra note 38, § 23.01 (discussing the MLA generally); Gary L. Trotter & Q. Zane Rhodes II,
Catalytic Oxygen Removal for the Aberdeen Coal Mine Methane Project in Carbon County, Utah,
Laurance Reid Gas Conditioning Conference (2008), available at http://newpointgas.com/blog/
wp-content/uploads/2009/11/zanes-2008-gpa-paper-website.pdf (giving a technical description
of the methane capturing process, indicating it is a profitable step toward lower greenhouse gas
emissions for underground coal mines).
152

See generally 30 U.S.C. §§ 181–263; see also supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text
(discussing the MLA generally).
153

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 21–22; see also supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the
IBLA’s criticism of the Director’s reasoning upholding the MLA lease while maintaining the MLA
did not apply).
154

See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the IBLA’s criticism of the Director’s opinion).
155

30 U.S.C. §§ 189, 201, 226; United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414,
416–19 (1931) (citing United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); Williams v. United States,
138 U.S. 514 (1891); Knight v. Ass’n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891)) (“[U]nder the [MLA], the granting
156
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In this case, the BLM could have invoked its secretarial discretion to issue a lease
under FLPMA, or it could have declined to issue any lease for the capture of
the vented gas at issue.157 In past disputes regarding CBM ownership, the BLM
invoked its discretion by halting all leasing activities and awaiting appropriate
judicial or legislative clarification.158 Furthermore, the BLM has previously
implemented policies and guidelines for conflict resolution between coal and
CBM owners and developers.159 The BLM offered no explanation why this
alternative dispute resolution was not employed in the instant case, nor did the
IBLA in contravening existing precedent.160

Environmental and Political Considerations
The Vessels decision is important to understand because it highlights significant
environmental and political policy considerations. It is uncontroversial that
methane is a greenhouse gas that should not simply be vented into the atmosphere
if doing so can be avoided.161 According to the EPA, methane is a potent
greenhouse gas that is “extremely effective at trapping heat in the atmosphere” and
at least “20 times more powerful (by weight) at warming than carbon dioxide.”162
Other sources indicate “methane has 25–30 times more ‘radiative effect’ (than
carbon dioxide), and scientists believe that increased methane concentrations
are responsible for roughly 15–20% of the global warming.”163 Coal mining is
of a prospecting permit for oil and gas is discretionary with the Secretary of the Interior, and any
application may be granted or denied . . . as the facts may be deemed to warrant.”); see also 38 Am.
Jur. 2d Gas and Oil § 260 (1999) (discussing the Secretary’s authority).
157
See supra notes 39, 156 and accompanying text (discussing the broad discretion the
Secretary of the Interior has in determining whether to issue MLA leases); supra notes 42–44 and
accompanying text (discussing the broad discretion the Secretary of the Interior has to authorize
land uses under the FLPMA); see also Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 10 (“We have determined that oil and
gas development is incompatible with underground longwall mines, so oil and gas leases will not be
offered over coal lands contained within the mine permit areas for the existing coal mines or within
tracts expected to be developed in the next ten years.”); supra note 74 (discussing IBLA’s policy
against leasing over coal mines).
158
Windsor, supra note 45, at 915–16 (citing Jeanine Feriancek, Coal and Coalbed Methane
Development Conflicts: No Easy Solution, 14 Nat. Resources & Env’t 260 (2000)).

Id.; see also Instruction Memorandum No. 2003-253 from the BLM Director
on Policy and Guidance on Conflicts between Coalbed Natural Gas (CBNG) and
Surface Coal Mine Development in the Powder River Basin to State Directors, Wyoming
and Montana (Aug. 21, 2003), available at http://www.blm.gov/wy/st/en/programs/
energy/CAZ/im2003-253.html. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Bureau of Land Management,
Conflict Administration Zone, http://www.blm.gov/wy/st/en/programs/energy/CAZ.html (last
visited May 26, 2010).
159

160
See Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 25–28 (failing to discuss the possibility of conflict administration
zoning for CMM and coal leasing).
161
See generally Davis, supra note 30; Flaherty, supra note 30; EPA CMOP, supra note 21; EPA
Global Mitigation, supra note 29.
162

EPA CMOP Brochure, supra note 31.

163

Flaherty, supra note 30, at 87 (quoting Lewin et al., supra note 16, at 585).
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responsible for approximately ten percent of all manmade methane emissions in
the United States.164 In addition to the harmful effects venting methane has on
the environment, the gas is also a valuable economic resource that should not be
wasted.165 Given these environmental consequences and policy goals, there needs
to be a determination regarding who owns federal methane in all its various forms
and how it is to be leased, so methane producers and coal miners can legally
achieve these goals.166
Vessels also raises a practical issue regarding entitlement to bonuses, rentals,
and royalties.167 Mineral leases issued under the MLA are subject to payments of
bonuses, rentals, and royalties to the United States.168 The United States shares
the profits of these payments equally with the state from which minerals are
extracted.169 If gas vented from coal mines and produced for market is not subject
to the MLA, then the bonuses, rentals, and royalties collected by the United States
on that gas are not subject to the fifty percent apportionment to the states required
by the MLA.170 Many states are likely to oppose CMM leasing that allows the
United States to profit from royalties on minerals extracted inside a state’s borders
without apportioning any of the royalty to the state. 171 The practical result of
164

EPA CMOP Brochure, supra note 31.

E.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-102 (2009); Flaherty, supra note 30, at 71, 87; see also supra
note 34 (citing other statutes expressly discouraging waste of natural resources).
165

166
See Jeanine Feriancek, supra note 158, at 262–63 (discussing proposed legislation that
would establish judicial procedure for disposing of conflicts between CBM and coal owners and
developers); see also Windsor, supra note 45, at 918–19.

Vessels Coal Gas, Inc., 175 I.B.L.A. 8, 28 n.13 (2008); see MacKinnon & Fox, supra note
47, at 370 (“The production of methane gas from coal beds has grown dramatically in Wyoming
since the late 1990s, with 2003 gas production valued at about $1.5 billion, translating into some
$257 million in tax and royalty income to the state and counties.”).
167

168

See generally 30 U.S.C. § 191 (2006); 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1759 (2006).

30 U.S.C. § 191(a); see also New Mexico v. Regan, 745 F.2d 1318, 1319 (10th Cir. 1984)
(“The Mineral Leasing Act (Mineral Act) directs the Secretary of the Treasury to pay fifty percent
(50%) of all mineral royalties received from federal lands to the states in which the leased federal
lands are located.”).
169

170
See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text; see also Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 28 n.13
(“Our holding . . . that the leases were not properly issued under the MLA necessarily means
that the apportionment of funds to the State of Utah, under 30 U.S.C. § 191(a) (2000) does not
apply here.”).
171
See New Mexico v. United States, 831 F.2d 265, 269 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (litigating whether
apportionment to the states should happen before or after the federal windfall tax is collected);
Regan, 745 F.2d at 1319 (involving a dispute over calculation of severance taxes); Alaska v. Andrus,
436 F. Supp. 288, 291–92 (D. Alaska 1977) (disputing whether revenues collected from mineral
leasing of wildlife refuge lands should be subject to apportionment to the state under 30 U.S.C.
§ 191); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Wyoming, 751 P.2d 379, 382–83 (Wyo. 1988) (determining the terms
“gas” and “natural gas” include all types of gas, not just those with hydrocarbons, for purposes
allowing the state to collect more money from Amoco under an excise tax statute); see also Vessels,
175 I.B.L.A. at 28 n.13; C.C. Co., 116 I.B.L.A. 384, 387 (1990) (indicating BLM has authority to
collect royalty on vented natural gas).
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Vessels means the United States profits from the royalty collected from Oso, while
the state of Utah gains nothing.172

Conclusion
The IBLA’s decision in Vessels Coal Gas, Inc. raises questions regarding the
appropriate authority for issuing leases to capture vented CMM.173 The IBLA
effectively balanced competing policy goals in Vessels.174 However, the pragmatic
result the IBLA reached is incommensurable with existing law.175 The concerns
raised by the IBLA in Vessels can be addressed by existing legitimate alternatives
without contravening precedent.176 Admittedly, the existing alternatives may
not be the most precise tools for CMM leasing, but this fact only highlights
the need for legislative clarification.177 Furthermore, any future application of the
rule Vessels ultimately establishes will produce untenable results.178 Given these
considerations, it is apparent there is an exceptional opportunity to simultaneously
prevent waste of natural resources and harm to the environment, while reaping
the economic benefits of mineral production.179 For these reasons, a more definite
legal framework for methane leasing in all its various forms should be established
to ensure stability of the production of methane as a valuable natural resource.180

172

Vessels, 175 I.B.L.A. at 28 n.13.

Id. at 27. The IBLA raises this issue indirectly by its decision that the MLA is the
inappropriate authority for these leases, and questions whether or not the BLM has “authority at
all to issue leases, permits, or contracts for the capture of the vent gas, similar to the ones issued to
Oso.” Id.
173

174

See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text.

175

See supra notes 37–41, 112–25, 141–51 and accompanying text.

176

See supra notes 37–41, 115–18, 136–40, 156–60 and accompanying text.

177

See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.

178

See supra notes 119–25 and accompanying text.

179

See supra notes 161–72 and accompanying text.

180

See supra notes 151, 166 and accompanying text.
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